The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the word “Taliban” will be used for the period when it was outside the central government) had made many immense political and social mistakes, but also achieved many phenomenal successes during the first period (1996-2001). Its main problems include soaring poverty and unemployment, a severe decline and inadequacy of public services, the deprivation of the right of women to work and education, and the isolation of Afghan society from the larger world. On the other hand, its achievements of previously endemic anarchy in the country, the reconstitution of the centre of political gravity, and the resultant restoration of the country’s territorial integrity.
What brought the end of the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was the disproportionate, uncalculated, irrational and person-oriented policies implemented in the domestic and foreign fields. Examples include forcing people to attend prayers at mosque, compelling them to grow beards, the deprivation of women from working and education, and making it compulsory to wearing local clothes. Such policies were implemented without a thorough observation of society.
Externally, a passive and isolation-centred foreign policy was pursued. Instead of eliminating the concerns and fears of regional and global states, steps that exacerbated their concerns were taken. Foremost amongst these were the granting of asylum for organisations such as Al-Qaeda organization, amongst others, on Afghan soil.
Understanding and rationalising the decision making process of the leaders of the Taliban helps us understand why their first Emirate collapsed in 2001. It also illustrates that if the same reasoning persists, their current government could potentially share a similar fate.
Most of the leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are people who received madrasah education and specialised in Islamic studies, resultantly unaware of the intricacies of modern politics, international relations, economics, sociology, psychology and international law. Confronted with the realities of the modern world, much of which would be considered sinful [haram] or disliked [makrooh], the general impetus has been to issue official edict to correct the perceived wrong. This should not come as a surprise; their education in the sacred sciences has imbibed within them the sense that has imbued within them an ascetic disregard for the affairs of the world as part of striving toward the hereafter. This further materialises in viewing the affairs of government and state as an extension of their own personal quest for salvation in the hereafter; attained through enforcing divine strictures on the temporary, fleeting world.
From a religious perspective, having such a perspective is praiseworthy. It does, however, entail the risk of not accounting for the foresight and wisdom necessary to help an Islamic state survive and thrive.
The negligence and lack of foresight is most clearly demonstrated in the approach of the first Taliban Emirate. When the United States, in the aftermath of 9/11, demanded Mullah Omar to hand over Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar had three options: handing over Osama to the United States, ordering him to leave the country, and granting Bin Laden asylum in the country. He neither handed Osama to the United States nor ordered him to leave the country, and instead granted him asylum. The decision was made bearing in light of religious and cultural norms, not on strictly political calculation. Surrendering a Muslim to an disbeliever was, after all, religiously forbidden, whilst disloyalty to an ally was treason according to cultural norms.
The decision was political suicide, and, as transpired, his decision soon led to his total loss of political power. It is political suicide for a small and weak state to take the risk of going to war with a state that is much stronger in military, political, economic and ideological areas than itself. Justice and morality, of course, can very well be on the side of a weak state, yet political prudence does not justify going to war with a superpower. Politically speaking, preserving state and ensuring the welfare of the nation is the foremost and supreme duty of a leader. Securing and keeping the survival of the state is a superior value and virtue as well.
It was his own salvation in the hereafter that Mullah Omar took into account in 2001, not the survival of his Islamic Emirate and sacrifices of those who had lost their lives for its establishment. Conversely, it was the same pursuit of salvation in the hereafter that motivated and drove him to wage a fierce and bloody jihad against the US to restore his Islamic Emirate. It was the same for the tens of thousands of madrassah students and other Afghans who sacrificed their lives for the same goal. The sacrifices of those Afghans from 2001 to 2021 may well have been justified, yet it is in ensuring the survival of the state and the security of its inhabits in which real political wisdom and supreme moral virtue would lie.
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regained political power on 15th August 2021, after sacrificing thousands of its soldiers and people due to its political negligence in 2001. In the first seven months, IEA did not change much within the country, followed a relatively soft and laissez-faire. In particular, the active but soft and trust-based policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was applauded by almost all states in the international arena. These policies duly created the image that the Emirate has learned from past mistakes, raising hopes at home and abroad that Afghanistan is moving towards peace and prosperity. The domestic actions of the past two weeks, however, have frustrated, shocked and disappointed many at home as well as in the international community. The closure of girls’ schools above sixth grade, increasing interference in manners of dress and the absence of women in high political positions have reminded observers at home and abroad of the Taliban’s first Emirate. The repeat of such policies would lead to a heavy price once again being paid by state and society alike.
Domestic Impacts
These latest policies of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will increase the social crisis and security problem within the country. Afghan people are already living in a depression and stress due to unemployment, poverty, political uncertainty, economic and financial sanctions imposed by the US, the psychological and material legacies left by the 43-year war, and other social crimes and crises. The latest policies of the AIE are widening and deepening this social crisis rather than reducing it. Secondly, such policies reinforce the claims of the opponents of the IEA and pave the way for internal turmoil and violent conflicts. According to their claims, the IEA is a state that does not respect human rights, deprives women of their basic rights, and enforces rules by iron hand. Today, IEA prides itself on providing the most security, and it really deserves commendation and credit. The IEA has succeeded in reining the internal armed organizations. But the IEA should not fall into the 2001 delusions of former Afghan political leaders and the United States. They too had the illusion that the Taliban had completely been destroyed and that they would never be revived. Their biggest mistake was ignoring social, cultural and political realities and they trusted in their own material power and the dreams they had in their minds. But soon the Taliban regrouped within 2-3 years and started resistance, lasted for 20 years.
The Islamic Emirate should keep in mind that there are 3 important reasons for the current relative security and peace: first, the existence of political and military unity and harmony among the leaders of the Islamic Emirate; second, the nation’s hatred of the former state’s policies and the material and mental trauma and fatigue of the 43-year war; and third, perhaps the most important one, neighboring, regional and global states do not provide political, financial, and military support to internal opposition groups. The existence and provision of current security are based on these 3 essential factors. If one of these elements change direction, it indicates the beginning of turmoil and hot conflict, and if all 3 factors change direction, then Afghanistan will have to relive and re-experience the 1990s.
Effects Outside the Country
These policies have undermined the international legitimacy and official recognition process of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. As it is known, the Taliban has a problem of mutual trust with other states, especially with Western states, for more than 20 years. The mutual trust revived, among IEA and Western states, with the commencing of peace negotiation in 2018, it has evolved following the USA-Taliban peace treaty in 2021, and then the complete withdrawal of foreign powers from the country on August 31, 2021.
It is a fact that states do not fully trust each other, but it can reduce the rate of fear and anxiety among them and increase mutual trust. Fear, between states, does not go down to 0% and trust does not go up to 100%. Since 1995, the fear and anxiety of the Western states towards the Islamic Emirate was very high. The Peace treaty and the moderate policies pursued by the Islamic Emirate in the last 7 months reduced this rate and an atmosphere of mutual trust was established. If the IEA wants to accelerate the process of international legitimacy and official recognition, it should consider two important points in its decision-making process.
The first is that in democratic states, the ruling party and the leader consider the norms of institutions in the country and the psychology of citizens when making important decisions in foreign policy. Citizens of Western states do not have a positive vision and approach towards the Islamic state form in general and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in particular. In their minds, Islam is a religion that does not respect human rights and women’s rights, especially women’s educational and political rights. The rise of Islamophobia in Western states is a clear and typical reflection of this mentality. Therefore, the IEA should not follow a policy that strengthening and deepening this mentality and prejudices. Because the opposite policies will have a bad effect on bilateral relations and will slow down and prolong the process of international legitimacy and official recognition.
Secondly, in accordance with the first point, the policies of the EIA should focus on reducing the fears and anxieties of Western states and increasing mutual trust. For western states, the security of the state is more important than human rights and women’s rights. If human rights and women’s rights have been of primary importance, they would have not supported Abdulfattah Sisi, who brought down the democratically elected Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi with military coup and executed hundreds of people in front of the whole world. Also, the Western states are silent on Israel’s oppression and cruelties inflicted on Palestinian women and children. Therefore, the main fear of the West from the IEA is that the IEA will support the armed organizations that the West regards as a threat, also this fear stems from the imagination that IEA will follow an ideologically based expansionist policy in the future. Therefore, the international legitimacy and official recognition process will not begin unless the IEA does not reduce these fears and concerns of Western states.
Conclusion
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s foremost duty is to save the country and nation from internal and external turmoil and conflicts in the light of political wisdom and prudence. The Afghanistan Islamic Emirate can and should take lessons from its own civilization as well as from Western political leaders who lived in recent times. These leaders, in times of crisis, endeavored to not incite societal tranquility with their provoking domestic policies, rather established good relations with their external enemies, and tried to increase mutual trust, not fear. The Afghanistan Islamic Emirate is in its infancy in the military, economic and political spheres. During this period, it should learn to stand, walk on its own feet, and struggle to survive in the anarchical arena. Unfortunately, the policies followed recently by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are pushing both the Islamic state and the Afghan people towards destruction. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with its political wisdom and prudence, must stop this cycle of violence that has been going on since 1978. The leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan should not endanger the life of this Islamic state, its reputation in the world and the welfare of the nation, with their person-oriented, self-salvage, emotional, irrational, ill-calculated and far from political wisdom and prudence policies. In this anarchic structure, they should realize that the survival of the Islamic state and the welfare of the nation are superior and more important than themselves.