Another year has ended. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, it has been a characteristically jumbled year. The year’s second half very much followed the path identified in the first half of the year: the Taliban, despite tensions with Pakistan and a proclivity toward bans on women, are slowly becoming mainstream.
Normalisation with Russia continues; Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, was sent to Kabul by President Putin to strengthen ties. Legislative work, meanwhile, to remove the Taliban from the Kremlin’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations is ongoing. In Abu Dhabi, the Afghan ambassador was formally received by President Muhammad Bin Zayed.
On the economic front, the transnational TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas pipeline was formally unveiled. A host of economic projects continue to progress, including the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar as well as the inauguration of the Shah wa Arus dam just north of Kabul.
At the same time, Afghanistan continues to struggle with an ongoing humanitarian crisis. The crisis has only been exacerbated by the return, overwhelmingly involuntarily, of roughly one million Afghans from Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Neither has Afghanistan escaped controversy; a law outlining the remit of the Ministry of Vice and Virtue included the banning of photography, the Nawruz celebration, and even disobedience to parents. It also mandated the covering of women’s faces.
The law’s implementation, however, has been remarkably lacklustre. This has only left many in even deeper in confusion as to the grey area between what is legally enshrined versus practically enforced in the Taliban’s Afghanistan. This confusion was underscored further with practically a ban on women’s medical institutes; a ban yet to be announced or legally enshrined. If what is legally codified is not practically enforced, the opposite is also true.
The key topics to note, however, are the growingly intertwined and, especially for Afghanistan, potentially existential pillars. ISKP (Daesh) on the one hand, and Pakistan on the other.
Pakistan
The year started with a visit to Afghanistan of Pakistani politician Mawlana Fazlur Rahman. Fazlur Rahman, the head of Pakistan’s Jamiat e Ulama ye Islam [JUI] party, has long been an Afghan Taliban ally, and visited Afghanistan as part of a wider push to mediate between Islamabad and Kabul. In the immediate aftermath, Fazlur Rahman’s visit, whilst attracting much coverage, achieved little. An entire year later, much remains the same.
The principal roadblock remains that of Islamabad’s repeated accusation of Kabul hosting the TTP. This claim has not been uncontested. Kabul has denied its territory is being used against Pakistan. Even within Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman was prominent in denying that the TTP was based in Afghanistan, instead accusing Pakistan itself of facilitating the US’ occupation of Afghanistan. Fazlur Rahman also publicly opposed the announcement of a new military operation against the TTP.
A variety of measures by Islamabad, including the deportation of millions of Afghans, have thus far failed to force Kabul’s hand. The weakness of Islamabad’s position is not due solely to its incapability to contain the TTP’s growing insurgency. In the aftermath of Imran Khan’s ouster in 2022, Pakistan’s divisions are deeper than ever. A ruthless crackdown by the country’s powerful military has failed to stop the outbreak of sporadic protests, widespread dissent, or arrest of its spiralling reputation. Divisions are palpable within the ruling coterie too. Pakistan’s former Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Asad Durrani, was reported by Pakistani outlet Dawn as having been dismissed due to his opposition to Pakistan’s heavy handed approach toward Afghanistan. A war of words even erupted over the Pakistani Defence Minister Asif’s lambasting of 11th century emperor Sultan Mahmud Ghaznawi as a ‘thief’, to which an Afghan response was especially bitter.
On 24th December, following months of frosty relations, Pakistan’s newly appointed Special Envoy Muhamamd Sadiq, who has also previously served in the same capacity, called on and met a variety of Afghan ministers, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Any hopes for a thaw in relations were abruptly sabotaged on the same night as Pakistani aircraft bombarded Afghanistan. The target, once again, was the province of Paktika. Lying on the Durand Line, Paktika still hosts thousands of displaced from the adjacent South Waziristan, who fled previous military operations against the TTP and have remained their since. Their presence, however, has also attracted accusations by Islamabad of TTP fighters being amongst them, attracting previous attacks as well. This time as well, the attack, even according to the UN, only managed to kill civilians. Dozens of them.
The Afghan response was swift. A chorus of condemnation followed suit, from both Taliban and non-Taliban figures, whilst the Pakistani charge d’affaires was summoned in Kabul. Four days later, on 28th December, Afghanistan retaliated. On its X (formerly known as Twitter) profile, the Afghan Ministry of Defence announced it had targeted ‘several points’ on the other side of the ‘supposed [Durand] Line’ from which attacks against Afghanistan had been organised by ‘malign elements,’ which analysts interpreted as referring to ISKP, which Pakistan is increasingly accused of harbouring.
Things remain chilling and ominously quiet between the two neighbours, but there remains little indication as to improved relations as 2025 beckons. The bleak outlook on relations looks set to continue; a reported escalation in the deportation of Afghans from Pakistan is currently underway, whilst Islamabad’s continues to struggle to contain the TTP amidst the Pakistani military growing loss of legitimacy.
The trajectory of relations between Kabul and Islamabad remains steady; steadily deteriorating.
Daesh/ISKP
The topic of Daesh has become increasingly intertwined with the recurring and major topic in Afghanistan’s foreign relations: Pakistan. More specifically, there is the growing accusation of Islamabad providing sanctuary to Daesh.
That allegation was first reported by The Afghan Eye in July 2023. In the almost immediate aftermath of a bilateral meeting in Kabul between a visiting Pakistani delegation and Afghan officials, Pakistani journalists and media sources had widely reported that the meeting had involved serious tension. Pakistan’s delegation, it was reported, had issued serious threats as to carrying out attacks inside Afghanistan if the alleged presence of the TTP were not solved. Afghan sources, meanwhile, had rubbished these claims to The Afghan Eye, and claimed that the issue of Pakistan’s harbouring of ISKP had been raised during the meeting.
The period since then has seen this particular allegation of Pakistani support for ISKP grow in public prominence. Al-Mirsad, an opaque outlet likely affiliated to the Taliban due to its reliance on sources from the Afghan General Directorate of Intelligence, was first to make the accusation directly. Al-Mirsad also published articles written by former TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, who went further in alleging Pakistan’s provision of sanctuary for ISKP in Khyber Agency’s Tirah valley, in Pakistan’s formerly Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
The period since then has seen the growing escalation in the sources of the accusation. In April 2024, Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi claimed three of Afghanistan’s neighbours supported ISKP, without naming them. This was followed by a major breakthrough when Afghan spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid directly accused Pakistan of harbouring ISKP. The accusation has since gone on to be seemingly endorsed even by former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and, most recently, by prominent Baloch activist Dr. Sabiha Baloch, who accused Islamabad of turning the town of Mastung in Balochistan into an ISIS hub.
Activity wise, meanwhile, ISKP struck hard. On 11th December, Afghan Minister of Refugees, Haji Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, was killed in his own office by a suicide bomber disguised as a visitor. ISKP quickly claimed responsibility for the killing, which was condemned by a host of foreign embassies. Accusations of Pakistani support notwithstanding, the killing may have been ISKP’s biggest blow yet; Haji Khalil’s importance was not derived from his relatively minor ministerial portfolio, but his profile as jihadi veteran of four decades against Soviet Union and USA alike, and as the brother of Jalaluddin Haqqani and uncle of Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Haqqani.
Whilst the group’s activity has undoubtedly been suppressed, the attack underscored the group’s ability to launch high profile, even if limited, attacks. His burial saw Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi claim the attack had been orchestrated outside Afghanistan, and appealing to the group’s backers, which he did not name, to not ‘turn a blind eye’ to the group’s presence.
To summarise 2024: more diplomatic normalisation and economic projects, but predictably worsening tension with Pakistan, and inevitably escalating bans on women.