As the world order continues to shift over the tremors of a Western-aided massacre in Gaza, the Taliban flex their increasing diplomatic muscle.
Afghanistan, it is commonly said, has long suffered due to the centrality of its geographic location. Sat at the heart of Asia along the historic Silk Roads, its location at the crossroads of the Middle East, China, as well as South and Central Asia makes the country uniquely predisposed to being tugged into the orbits of the wider blocs surrounding it.
That, however, is only half the story. Whilst its geographic centrality undoubtedly poses challenges, it is also true that successive Afghan governments across eras and ideological persuasions have rarely demonstrated the acumen required to navigate either regional convulsions or global currents. The country, therefore, has been doomed to the unenviable position of serving as the regional epicentre for instability, even if the roots of that instability were planted afar. Highlighting the effects of regional and global geopolitics on Afghanistan is no doubt poignant in an appraisal of its modern history. It is also poignant in assessing the first half of 2024.
In a rare change, the trajectory of global currents seems to actually be working in favour of those in Kabul’s corridors of power, or, at least, Kabul seems capable of leveraging global currents in its favour. As an increasingly multipolar world order takes shape amidst the shifts resulting from an ongoing Western-aided massacre in Gaza, Kabul has quietly gone about its foreign policy objectives. It has taken control of foreign embassies previously outside its orbit, including Uzbekistan. In a watershed, it has attracted foreign diplomats through successfully hosting its own conferences whilst soliciting invitations to attend high profile conferences overseas. Most importantly, it has, in effect if not principle, even achieved recognition by superpowers.
At the same time, relations with Pakistan, Afghanistan’s largest and most important neighbour, move further toward deterioration.
The Doha Conferences: A New Mode of Engagement?
Multilateral meetings on Afghanistan, as the international arena’s proverbial problem child, are hardly anything new. This time, in February, a UN meeting was scheduled in Doha, with a number of countries participating, including the United States, Qatar, China, Pakistan as well as the EU. The conference’s avowed aim was to allow for debate and discussion on how to interact and engage with the yet-unrecognised Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. A large part of that engagement, it was proposed, would be channelled through a Special UN Envoy for Afghanistan who was also yet to be appointed.
The appointment of a UN envoy, however, was opposed by Kabul. A UN Envoy, per spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, was intended for countries plagued by war, which Afghanistan no longer was. The conference, instead of serving as a forum for confidence-building and dialoge, was already creating a rupture.
After much commentary and a steadily-increasing standoff, Kabul ultimately declined to attend, and the conference’s efficacy was notably dampened as a result. Subsequent details revealed by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guiterress included the Taliban’s conditions for attendance, namely the exclusion of other Afghans termed as civil society activists. Kabul had effectively demanded, according to Guiterress, ‘treatment that would […] to a large extent be similar to recognition.’ Attendance at the conference was also declined by Russia, whose foreign ministry statement cited its absence to be on the request of the government of Afghanistan. China, meanwhile, expressed ‘regret’ that the conference had failed to provide a basis of engagement with Kabul.
If the Taliban’s intention was to drive a hard bargain, it worked. A successive UN conference was held, again in Doha, from 30th June to 1st July, on Afghanistan. This time, the Taliban did attend and, in another contrast, those termed Afghan civil society activists were controversially also excluded. Kabul’s demands had essentially been met and it had been recognised, in deed if not in word, as the sole address with which Afghanistan or Afghans could be engaged with. Discussions focussed on drugs, climate change, and ongoing financial sanctions. The high profile of the Afghan delegation was attested to by its being led by Zabihullah Mujahid.
Noteworthy was the synchronised messaging regarding the February meeting between Beijing, Kabul and Moscow. Whilst Beijing partook, its expression of regret dampened the conference’s already dim prospects, whereas Moscow explained its absence as being explicitly on the request of Kabul; a request heeded by Moscow.
Which leads to…
Has China Recognised the Taliban?
This story proceeds from 2023. On 1st December 2023, Bilal Karimi, the Afghan ambassador-designate to Beijing, was formally received by Hong Lei, an official at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We covered that story in our previous newsletter. As noted at the time, Karimi’s reception by a Chinese official was important, as was the fact that Karimi’s reception had only been conducted by a relatively junior official. At the time, Afghan Foreign Ministry Spokesman Balkhi did claim that Karimi’s credentials would be accepted by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Whether or not this would materialise, though, remained to be seen.
On 30th January, that was exactly what took place. In a broader ceremony involving the diplomats of dozens of other states, Karimi was received by the Chinese President.
The question of whether or if the Taliban would gain formal recognition internationally is resultantly moot. An Afghan ambassador-designate has been accepted by the Chinese head of state in a ceremony attended by dozens of other ambassadors, further underlining the normalcy of treatment afforded to Karimi. Practically speaking, little remains beyond Beijing verbally confirming its recognition of the Taliban.
We spoke to Afghan experts as to what they thought of the groundbreaking development.
Omar Samad, former Afghan ambassador to Canada and France, said that China’s step would be keenly monitored across Western capitals. Speaking to The Afghan Eye, Samad remarked that the ‘reception by the Chinese President of the Afghan envoy reflects China pushing the boundary of formal recognition to almost 99%, short of a formal announcement.’ The move represented the ‘gradual regional relaxation of the semi-isolation Afghanistan has […] experienc[ed]’ since August 2021. ‘Despite calls for flexibility on girls’ education rights restrictions and for national political outreach issues by many in the international community,’ Samad said, ‘both developments reflect the regionally-focussed and economically-oriented diplomacy pursued by Kabul.’
Similar was the perspective of Abdul Hai Qanit: Afghan political analyst, commentator, and International Relations scholar. Crucially, Qanit highlighted, Karimi’s reception reflected the increasing initiative shown regionally, and ‘signif[ied] the beginning of the end of the West’s monopoly on forming the international approach to and consensus on Afghanistan.’
Pre-empted by Beijing, there was little with which Western capitals could respond. Washington DC, predictably, was the principal capital wherein Karimi’s receptions was acknowledged, with spokesman Miller asking for ‘clarity’ from China on what the event meant. Even if such clarity were forthcoming, there would be little it could do to stop China, or reverse the clock of time.
Russia’s Warming Relations with Kabul
As 2023 came to a close, Moscow’s posture toward Kabul was one of mixed signals. As discussed in our previous newsletter, Russian special Envoy Zamir Kabulov had taken turns in censuring the Taliban and remarking, perhaps inappropriately, on Afghanistan’s ethnolinguistic makeup. Russia was also the destination for a gathering of anti-Taliban Afghan fugitives, including those busy attempting to wage war against the Taliban, albeit this was not hosted by the Kremlin directly. On the other hand, Kabulov made sure to visit, and been seen to visit, Afghan officials, including Foreign Minister Muttaqi and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haaqani.
As 2024 rolled on, however, Moscow’s messaging looked steadily warmer. The extent to which this was influenced by the Taliban’s growing normalisation, especially in the aftermath of China’s de-facto recognition of the group, is open to debate. In April, Russian officials confirmed their intent to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations; a step that would facilitate a later invite to Kabul to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. It was little surprise that the Taliban attended. Economic ties between Kabul and Moscow in the aftermath of August 2021 are not new. In 2022, a bilateral trade deal was signed, with Russia providing wheat, oil and gas and Kabul paying in Russian rubles, in a mutually beneficial transaction par excellence. Yet the appearance of the Taliban at an international forum, facilitated by Moscow, only signified the greater normalcy associated with the group. A privilege afforded to it by an increasingly friendly Russia.
Finally, in what seems to have been noted with alarm especially by Western media still hungover from two-decades of using ‘terrorism’ as a catch-all phrase, Russian President Vladimir Putin labelled the Taliban as the Kremlin’s ‘allies’ against terrorism.
Haji Khalifa: Taliban’s Growing Ties with the UAE
The theme of growing Taliban normalisation also jumped to the forefront of attention as June started in the Middle East and, especially, the Gulf. The Taliban’s presence at the funeral of late Iranian President Raisi had been observed, but it was relations with the UAE that came under the spotlight.
On 4th June, Emirati media posted pictures of UAE President Muhammad bin Zayed meeting the Afghan Minister of Interior: Sirajuddin Haqqani, also known as the Khalifa. The meeting marked a further episode in a yet-evolving and improving Taliban-UAE relationship which has come a long way. It was only in 2019 that Muhammad bin Zayed (known as MbZ) was reported to have pitched to Washington the assassination of Doha-based Taliban leaders. This was in order to prevent Afghanistan falling into the hands of ‘bearded bad guys,’ amidst the group’s ongoing negotiations with the Trump administration. The group’s takeover of Afghanistan, however, made interaction with them a fait accompli, especially insofar as the volume of Afghan trade conducted through the Emirates was concerned.
The first major development came in 2022; a UAE-based firm won the contract to administer Afghanistan’s airports, defying widespread expectation that it would be Qatar and Turkey, both of whom enjoyed relations with the Taliban and were Abu Dhabi’s regional rivals, that would end up administering the airports. In the same year, MbZ had also met Mullah Yaqoob: incumbent Minister of Defence and son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar. In March 2023, the Taliban were handed control of the Afghan consulate in Dubai: a key vector for Afghan trade and commerce.
The meeting with Khalifa, however, marked a new watershed. The Afghan Minister of Interior remains on an international sanctions lists and subject to a multimillion dollar FBI arrest warrant due to his classification as a specially designated global terrorist dating from the US occupation. Yet the Haqqani family’s personal relationship with the UAE predates the War on Terror; Khalifa’s father, Jalaluddin, is widely known to have taken an Emirati wife (reportedly a princess), having enjoyed warm relations with the UAE and other Gulf monarchies during the Soviet jihad.
Haqqani’s meeting with MbZ was followed by his visit to the city of Makkah in Saudi Arabia to complete the Hajj religious pilgrimage. It was later revealed that his travel was facilitated by a UN exemption from his and his counterparts’ existing travel ban. In that regard, MbZ had not broken any international rules in receiving the Khalifa. The public reception MbZ afforded to Khalifa, however, was quite different. It was no doubt intended to gain the attention of officials in Washington, for whom Haqqani had been a thorn for twenty years, as well as MbZ’s rivals in Qatar. It was also a major propaganda victory for Haqqani and the Taliban’s attempts at growing normalisation as a whole. Win-win.
Farid Senzai, Assistant Professor at Santa Clara University, called the meeting ‘significant.’ Speaking to The Afghan Eye, Senzai said that the meeting further signified the Taliban emergence from an isolation that the US had attempted to force it into. In this regard, the UAE was amongst other regional countries keen to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with Kabul, irrespective of who ruled. The benefits of the UAE rapprochement to Afghanistan, Senzai added, would likely lead to more trade.
Senzai, who also teaches Middle Eastern politics, also highlighted the intra-Gulf dynamics at play. Whilst the Taliban had forged close ties with Qatar over the years, the UAE was keen to ensure its interests in Kabul remained represented. ‘[The] UAE has seen the dividends of this role for Doha and wants to make sure it doesn’t lose out. Qatar’s diplomatic stance has allowed it to play an oversized role in the region,’ Senzai said. ‘MBZ understands this as well.’
The Deteriorating Relations Between Kabul and Islamabad
Relations between Kabul and Islamabad remain as much a bilateral phenomena as they remain the logical result and outward permutation of Pakistan’s domestic fissures. Amidst a controversial election haunted by the shadow of imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan and the exclusion of his PTI party, Pakistan’s domestic fissures have only grown deeper and attracted worldwide attention. Condemnation of the election was forthcoming from the US, UK, and the EU.
Given how intertwined the two neighbours are, Pakistan’s domestic fissures translate directly to its relationship with Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the year started with the visit to Kabul of veteran Pakistani politician and stalwart Afghan Taliban ally: Mawlana Fazlur Rahman. The aim of the trip was to attempt mediating between the two countries whose relations had steadily soured since 2021, primarily due to what Pakistan alleged was Kabul’s provision of refuge and safe haven for the TTP.
Fazlur Rahman’s trip was not without its highlights. He was received by a host of cabinet ministers, meeting with the Minister for Vice and Virtue Shaykh Khalid Hanafi, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Kabir and the Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund. The latter, in particular, conveyed to him Kabul’s position of not wanting to harm Pakistan. The main event, however, was Fazlur Rahman’s meeting with Amir Hebatullah Akhundzada in Qandahar. That made him only the second foreign politician to have secured an audience with the elusive Amir, after Qatar’s PM in 2023. The trip was concluded by an interview with Afghan state media outlet RTA.
Fazlur Rahman’s task in smoothing out differences was difficult as it was. That difficulty was only added to; barely as soon as he had arrived, any hopes his trip may have engendered were dimmed further by Islamabad. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson clarified that his visit was entirely in a personal capacity and not as a representative of Islamabad, which was not interested in any negotiations with the TTP. With the key stumbling block remaining in place, there was little Fazlur Rahman’s visit could achieve.
The lack of progress made in smoothing differences between the two exploded into full view on 18th March. In the aftermath of a deadly TTP attack on Pakistani troops on Mir Ali, Noth Waziristan, Pakistan retaliated. The province of Paktika, laying on the Durand Line and already hosting tens of thousands of refugees from previous anti-TTP operations in adjacent Waziristan, was bombarded in what Islamabad termed as an ‘intelligence based anti-terrorism operation.’ The specific target was reported to be TTP commander Abdullah Shah, alleged to be in the area. Kabul denied the presence of Abdullah Shah, claiming only civilians had been killed in the attack, and retaliated by raiding various checkpoints on the Line. Most embarrassingly for Pakistan, video footage emerged and circulated on social media mere hours after the attack, purportedly showing Abdullah Shah to be alive and, more importantly, in Pakistan.
The period since then has only seen an escalating war of words. In Afghanistan, what seems to be a state-affiliated outlet called Al-Mirsad has upped the ante against Pakistan. Pakistan and Tajikistan together, Al-Mirsad claims, actively support Daesh/ISKP in Afghanistan. The escalating propaganda war has found itself reflected in official and direct statements. In April, Foreign Minister Muttaqi implicated three unnamed neighbouring countries in supporting Daesh/ISKP, which indirectly echoed Al-Mirsad’s claims as to Pakistan and Tajikistan’s alleged support for Daesh/ISKP, and leaving the third country as guesswork. On Pakistan’s side, Defence Minister Asif recently threatened to continue attacks on Afghanistan, whilst Islamabad has leveraged its presence at international fora to bang the War on Terror’s tired drums. Most recently, it was the turn of Munir Akram: Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN. Kabul, according to Akram, had failed to rein in the TTP, which could soon serve as a ‘global terrorist threat’.
The war of words looks set to continue and so too, depressingly, does the increasing regularity of armed confrontations.